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BLANKET WAIVERS

“BLANKET WAIVERS” SHOULD BE KEPT UNDER THE COVERS WHERE THEY BELONG

Should a youth charged with serious felonies be automatically prosecuted in adult court

based solely on a blanket waiver order entered by a presiding Judge of that county’s Court,

without any individualized judicial determination of the youth's sophistication, maturity, or

amenability to rehabilitation?

The answer, under Oregon law, is no. At least, that is my perspective and I plan to argue

this to Linn Benton County Court later this year. Benton County entered a blanket waiver order

under ORS 419C.370 on May 30, 1996, approximately thirty years ago. The order authorizes the

waiver of all cases involving violation of a law or ordinance relating to the use or operation of a

motor vehicle, boating laws, or game laws to adult criminal or municipal court. In the case I am

handling, The State appears to be invoking this blanket waiver order as the basis for prosecuting

juveniles in adult court, arguing that any offense which were committed using a motor vehicle

falls within the scope of the blanket waiver.

For example, what if a youth is accused of serious crimes such as Manslaughter in the

First Degree (a Class A felony), Manslaughter in the Second Degree (a Class B felony),

Criminally Negligent Homicide (a Class B felony), Assault in the Second Degree (a Class B

felony?) These are serious violent felonies under Oregon's person-crime statutes. But what if

those offenses allegedly happened while said youth was operating a motor vehicle? Should the

State be able to file an indictment directly in adult circuit court, apparently relying on a blanket

waiver order entered by Benton County in 1996-thirty years ago-to bypass the mandatory

individualized waiver procedure that Oregon law requires for youth charged with such serious

offenses?


The idea that the state might be able to do this rests on a single factual allegation

appended to each count: that the youth operated a motor vehicle in the commission of the

offense. From this allegation, the State extracts a sweeping legal conclusion: that because a

motor vehicle was involved, the charges fall within the scope of a blanket waiver order designed

for routine traffic violations, and therefore no individualized waiver hearing is necessary.

First, these types of charges are not violations of laws relating to the use or operation of

motor vehicles. They are serious felonies under Oregon's person-crime statutes that define

homicide, assault, and endangerment offenses based on harm to human beings and culpable

mental states regarding that harm. The fact that a motor vehicle was allegedly used as the

instrumentality to commit these offenses does not transform them into motor vehicle violations.

A homicide remains a homicide; an assault remains an assault. The blanket waiver provision

does not encompass such serious person crimes.

Second, the State cannot circumvent Oregon's mandatory waiver procedure by simply

appending motor vehicle allegations to felony counts. ORS 419C. 349 requires that when the

State seeks to prosecute a youth aged fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen for a Class A or Class B

felony, the State must file a motion in juvenile court requesting a waiver hearing, the juvenile

court must conduct that hearing, and the court must make specific findings regarding the youth's

sophistication and maturity before jurisdiction may be transferred to adult court. These

protections exist to ensure that decisions to prosecute youth as adults are made on an

individualized basis, considering the youth's circumstances and developmental capabilities.

Third, the statutory structure of Oregon's juvenile waiver laws reflects a deliberate

legislative choice to require individualized assessment for serious felonies while permitting

blanket waiver only for narrowly defined categories of lesser offenses. Permitting the State to


bypass ORS 419C. 349 by appending motor vehicle allegations to felony counts would nullify

the statute's protections and convert the blanket waiver exception into an unlimited pathway for

automatic adult prosecution of juveniles.

Oregon law establishes that juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over youth

offenders, subject to limited exceptions. ORS 419C. 349 requires that when the state seeks to

prosecute a youth aged fifteen, seventeen, or seventeen for conduct that would constitute a Class

A or Class B felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall conduct a waiver hearing

before jurisdiction may be waived to adult court. ORS § 419C.349. ORS 419C. 370(1)(a)

provides a narrow exception to this requirement, allowing blanket waiver orders for cases

involving violations of a law or ordinance relating to the use or operation of a motor vehicle.

Oregon's juvenile justice system is built on the foundational principle that juvenile court

has exclusive jurisdiction over youth offenders. This exclusive jurisdiction is not absolute-the

legislature has created limited exceptions-but those exceptions must be narrowly construed.

ORS 419C. 370 authorizes a juvenile court to enter an order directing that all cases

involving violation of a law or ordinance relating to the use or operation of a motor vehicle be

waived to criminal or municipal court. ORS § 419C.370. The statute also permits blanket waiver

for violations of boating laws, game laws, violations under state or local law, and certain

misdemeanors involving property crimes.

The statutory language is deliberately narrow and specific. It does not authorize blanket

waiver for all offenses in which a motor vehicle happens to be involved; rather, it is limited to

violations of laws that regulate vehicle use or operation. The distinction is critical: a violation

relating to vehicle operation refers to the nature of the statutory violation, not merely the

instrumentality used in committing an offense.


The statute includes procedural safeguards that underscore its limited scope. Cases

waived under the blanket order are subject to notice requirements, and the juvenile court may

direct that any such case be waived back to the juvenile court for further proceedings. This recall

mechanism ensures that individual cases can be returned to juvenile court where appropriate,

preventing the blanket waiver from operating inflexibly.

Child peeking out from under a patterned blanket in bed.
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